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et al.: Deeds--Estoppel--Confirmation of Married Woman's Conveyance
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
of the local statute would seem to place it in the latter group.
Prior to the instant case it was apparently settled law in West
Virginia that an indictment as a principal would not sustain a
conviction for an accessory. 4 It is difficult to -reconcile this rule
with the present holding.

DEEDs

-

CONVEYANCE. -

ESTOPPEL W,

CONFIRMATION OF MARRIED WOMAN'S

living apart from her husband, executed an

oil and gas lease of her own realty in 1930 for four years and as
long thereafter as oil and gas should be produced, but did not
acknowledge it in the form required by the West Virginia statute.' In 1931 the statute was changed so as to permit a married
woman to execute a deed as if she were a single woman.2 The
lessee paid delay rentals until 1933, when W executed a deed purporting to lease the same property to the plaintiffs, who brought
this action to enjoin the former lessee from operating. Held, that
"
although in the view of the court the lease of 1930 was void, W
and her assignees were estopped to deny the validity of that lease.
4
Hanley v. Richards.
Although the result reached by the court is palpably sound,
it seems that a consistent use of terms strictly applied would not
permit "estoppel" to give this "void" deed effect as a conveyance.' This result might well have been attained by treating the
fact and a principal felon, by making such accessory, in every felony, punishable as if he were the principal in the first degree, and punishable in the
county in which the principal felon might be indicted."
14 State v. Roberts, supra n. 5; State v. Cremeans, supra n. 5; see State v.
Lilly, 47 W. Va. 496, 497, 35 S. E. 837 (1900); State v. Powers, 91 W. Va.
737, 747, 113 S. E.912 (1922).

1W. VA. CODE (1923) c. 73, § 6
2W. VA.REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 3,

§ 3.

v. Pierce, 45 W. Va. 654, 31 S. E. 972 (1898).
•
'Bennett
4178 S.E. 805 (W. Va. 1935).
"W. VA. REv. Copn (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 1: "No estate of inheritance

or freehold, or for a term of more than five years, in lands, or any other interest or term therein of any duration under which the whole or any part of the
corpus of the estate may be taken, destroyed, or consumed, except for domestic
A lease of land
use, shall be created or conveyed unless by deed or will."
for the purpose of extracting oil or natural gas is, in effect, a grant of a part
of the corpus of the land. Haskell v. Sutton, 53 W. Va. 206, 44 S. E. 533
(1903).
In Drake v. O'Brien, 83 W. Va. 678, 99 S. E. 280 (1919), the lessee took
possession under a parol oil and gas lease and paid the royalties for many
years. The court held it to be an implied tenancy from year to year, saying
it could not be more than that, for lack of deed or will creating it. In 1931
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deed as voidable, subject to the married woman's ratification upon
attaining the status of feme sole. Respectable authority indicates
that a married woman's contract is of sufficient force to support
ratification after her disability has been removed by statute,' by
divorce, 7 or by death of her husband.8 The married woman's
contract might well be considered analogous to the infant's contract and similarly voidable at her election when her disability
is removed.9 Treating the deed as voidable, W's acceptance of
delay rentals would be an implied ratification or confirmation
rendering the deed valid,1" and thus satisfying the requirements
of the West Virginia statute without straining the meaning of
"void"."' Such a technique would have the further advantage
of making it unnecessary to invoke the principles of estoppel, for
it is questionable whether such principles are properly applied in
a case of this kind.1"
the following phrase was added in the above statute: "Or any other interest
or term therein of any duration under which the whole or any part of the
corpus of the estate may be taken, destroyed, or consumed, except for domestic
use."
The legislature apparently intended that no oil and gas lease should
be created unless by deed or will. The effect of the principal case, however,
would be to establish an oil and gas lease for four years and as long thereafter as oil and gas should be produced, merely by the acceptance of delay
rentals, the deed being void.
6Steinberger v. Young, 175 Cal. 81, 165 Pac. 432 (1917).
7 Simon's Estate, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 450 (1902).
8 Brown v. Bennett, 75 Pa. 420 (1874) ; Price v. Hart, 29 Mo. 171 (1859);
Pettus v. Gault, 81 Conn. 415, 71 Atl. 509 (1908); cf. Mills v. Tabor, 182
N. C. 722, 109 S. E. 850 (1921).
9 Many types of infants' contracts were early held to be void, but recently
the generally accepted view has been that all infants' contracts, with slight
exceptions, are voidable. See 1 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 223, 226,
227. This change has been made on the ground that the infant, on arriving
at his majority, should be allowed to determine whether he will be bound and
that he is sufficiently protected by his right of avoidance. See Coursolle v.
Weyerhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 332, 72 N. W. 697, 699 (1897). Likewise the
married woman should be given this privilege upon attaining the status of
a feme sole.
'0 Darrough v. Blackford, 84 Va. 509, 5 S. E. 542 (1888).
11 Some courts, reasoning consistently, hold that since the married womanIs
contract is void it cannot be ratified after discoverture. Rawlings v. Neal, 126
N. C. 159, 35 S. E. 254 (1900). However, other courts have held that her
void deed during coverture can be ratified. Jourdan v. Dean, 175 Pa. 599,
34 Atl. 958 (1896).
These latter authorities evidently mean it is not void
for the purpose of ratification. If the court means that in the principal case,
the desired result can be effected. Our court has recognized the fact that
void may not mean void for all purposes. Ketterman v. Railroad Company,
48 W. Va. 606, 37 S. E. 683 (1900) ; Swann v. Thayer, 36 W. Va. 46, 14 S. E.
423 (1892).
32 Nims v. Sherman, 43 Mich. 45, 4 N. W. 434 (1880); see also svpra n.5.
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